DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS

Le conoscenze fornite riguardano i fondamenti dell'economia dello sviluppo, sia per quanto riguarda gli aspetti microeconomici che quelli macroeconomici.
Nel primo caso gli obiettivi principali sono quelli di analizzare: (1) ruolo ed efficacia dell’intervento del FMI e della Banca Mondiale nell’allocazione delle risorse finanziarie nei paesi emergenti; (2) ruolo ed efficacia degli aiuti internazionali; (3) debito sovrano.
Nel secondo caso gli obiettivi sono quelli di analizzare (i) i legami fra crescita, sviluppo e disuguaglianza nei paesi in via di sviluppo; (ii) i fallimenti dei principali mercati (del lavoro, del credito e della terra) e gli effetti sul benessere delle famiglie; (iii) l'evoluzione delle istituzioni e/o dei meccanismi, formali e informali, messi in atto dalle famiglie per affrontare le incompletezze dei mercati.

Contenuti

MACROECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT:
1: ROLE OF IMF
a) Participation (who controls the IMF?)
b) Implementation and effects
2: FOREIGN AID
Introduction
a) Aid allocation (bilateral aid and multilateral aid)
b) Aid effectiveness
3: SOVEREIGN DEBT
Introduction
a) Incentives (sanctions and reputation)
b) Distortions:
c) Remedies (debt restructuring and debt relief)
MICROECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT:
1: Introduction to Economic Development issues
2: Theories of Economic Growth
3: Human Capital, Technical Progress and Growth
4: Institutions, Inequality, and Development
5: Poverty & Intra-Household Resource Allocation
6: Land Market and Tenancy
7: Rural Labor Market
8: Credit Market

Programma esteso

MACROECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT:
1: ROLE OF IMF
a) PARTICIPATION
• Dreher, A., J.E. Sturm, and J.R. Vreeland (2008) “Global Horse Trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council.” European Economic Review 53: 742-757.
• Dreher, A, and N.M., Jensen (2007) “Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on IMF Conditions.” Journal of Law and Economics, 50, 105-124.
• Dreher, A., S. Marchesi and J.R. Vreeland (2008) “The political economy of IMF forecasts,” Public Choice, 137, 145–171
b) IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS
• Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.W. (2005) “IMF-programs: Who is chosen and what are the effects?” Journal of Monetary Economics, 52, 1245–1269.
• Dreher, A. (2006), “IMF and economic growth: the effects of programs, loans and compliance with conditionality” , World Development, 34, 769-788.
• Marchesi, S. (2003). Adoption of an IMF programme and debt rescheduling. An empirical analysis. Journal of Development Economics, 70(2), 403–423.
• Marchesi, S., L. Sabani and A. Dreher (2011) “Read my lips: the role of information transmission in multilateral reform design”, Journal of International Economics, 2011, Volume 84, pp. 86-98
• Marchesi S. and E. Sirtori (2011) “Is two better than one? Effects on growth of Bank-Fund interaction”, Review of International Organization, 2011, Volume 6, pp 287–306

2: FOREIGN AID
a) AID ALLOCATION
• Alesina, A., Dollar, D., (2000) Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth 5, 33--63.
• Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, and James R. Vreeland. (2009) “Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?” Journal of Development Economics 88: 1-18.
• Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, 2011, Are ‘New’ Donors Different Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between NonDAC and DAC Donor Countries? World Development 39, 11: 1950-1968.
• Dreher A., Langlotz S. and S. Marchesi (2016) “Information transmission and ownership consolidation in aid programs”, CEPR Working Paper 11443
• Kuziemko, Ilyana, and Eric Werker. (2006) "How much is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations." Journal of Political Economy, 114, 905-930.
• Marchesi S. and A. Missale (2013) Did high debts distort loans and grants allocation to IDA countries?, World Development, Volume 44, pp. 1-300
b) AID EFFECTIVENESS
• Burnside, C., Dollar, D., (2000) Aid, Policies and Growth. American Economic Review 90, 847--868.
• Dreher, Axel; Stephan Klasen; James Vreeland and Eric Werker, (2010) The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective? Courant Research Centre Discussion Paper 26, March 2010. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 62: 157-191
• Dreher, Axel; Eichenauer, V and K. Gehring (2013) "Geopolitics, Aid, and Growth”, CEPR Working Paper No. 9904
• Easterly, W. (2008) “Institutions: Top Down or Bottom Up?” American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 98, 95-99.
• Easterly William, Ross Levine, David Roodman (2004) “Aid, Policies, and Growth: Comment. ”The American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 774-780

3: SOVEREIGN DEBT
a) INCENTIVES:
Sanctions and reputation, costs of default
• Panizza U., Sturzenegger F. and J. Zettelmeyer (2009) The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default. Journal of Economic Literature 47(3), 1-47.
• Borensztein E. and U. Panizza (2009) The costs of sovereign default. IMF Staff Papers 56 (4), 683—741
• Cruces J. J. and C. Trebesch (2013) Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5, 85-117
• Levy Yeyati E. and U. Panizza (2011) The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults. Journal of Development Economics 94, 95-105.
• Trebesch C. and M. Zabel (2014) “The Output Costs of Hard and Soft Sovereign Default”, University of Munich, mimeo
b) DISTORTIONS:
Debt overhang; maturity and foreign currency composition; selectivity
• Claessens S., D.

Bibliografia consigliata

MACROECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT:
• Tirole, J., (2002) Financial Crises, Liquidity, and the International Monetary System, Princeton University Press.
• Radelet, S. (2006) “A Primer on Foreign Aid” Center for Global Development Working Paper 92.
• Reinhart C. M. and K.S. Rogoff (2009) This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Follies. Princeton University Press.

MICROECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT:
Testo principale: Debraj Ray, 1998, Development Economics.

Metodi didattici

Lezione frontale in aula

Anno di corso: 1

Anno di corso: 2